The AI-enabled vCISO
What gets delegated to an agent, what gets verified and what cannot be delegated. A four-level ladder and a measurement protocol, with explicit sources and limits.
How a small team links the governance of its AI use to the traceability of an agent operating tools in a lab.
A pentest with AI is not evaluating the security of the AI; a VM is not isolation; traceability is not conformance.
The paper describes the observed architecture of a lab where an agent drives tools over MCP inside a Kali VM against authorized own targets, and reads it against the public scope of ISO/IEC 42001:2023 and ISO/IEC 27090:2026. It proposes a governance-to-evidence table with the real status of each activity, mostly pending.
It reuses NullGhost’s evidence protocol: authorization, test plan, negative results as “not observed under these conditions,” independent verification and integrity via hashes. It is a single operation over own targets, not a benchmark; it records silent failure, browser differences and automation errors as limitations. Neither standard was read in full.