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Governance and evidence

From governance to evidence

How a small team links the governance of its AI use to the traceability of an agent operating tools in a lab.

A pentest with AI is not evaluating the security of the AI; a VM is not isolation; traceability is not conformance.

Observed architecture: operator, model, MCP connector, Kali VM and own targets, with evidence and its hashes kept apart. Three distinctions and four measured limitations. A 26-second silent animation.
Key data

Traceability measured, not conformance

What it offers

The paper describes the observed architecture of a lab where an agent drives tools over MCP inside a Kali VM against authorized own targets, and reads it against the public scope of ISO/IEC 42001:2023 and ISO/IEC 27090:2026. It proposes a governance-to-evidence table with the real status of each activity, mostly pending.

Method and limits

It reuses NullGhost’s evidence protocol: authorization, test plan, negative results as “not observed under these conditions,” independent verification and integrity via hashes. It is a single operation over own targets, not a benchmark; it records silent failure, browser differences and automation errors as limitations. Neither standard was read in full.